Tag Archive for 'troyak-as'

ZeuS: Cybercriminals moving over to FastFlux Hosting

A month ago, the well-known bulletproof hoster Troyak was cut from the internet (read more). Troyak tried hard to get reconnected to the internet – But the disconnect of Troyak made a lot of noise in the international press which led to that Troyak was not able to stay connected with the World Wide Web.

But maybe you wonder why the number of active ZeuS C&Cs still dropped after the Troyak shutdown. Let me clear this: After the shutdown of troyak, several other ISPs which went a platform for cybercriminals for month got obviously under massiv pressure from their upstream providers. Many of those ISPs contacted me during the last few weeks and made a clear statement that they no longer tolerate any cybercriminals in their networks.

The good news first:
Today, a month after the Troyak shutdown, the number of active C&C servers is still on a very low level. We are now at a point where ZeuS C&C servers get offline just a few minutes after they appears on the ZeuS Tracker.

And now the bad news:
During the last few days I just noticed that more and more ZeuS C&C servers popping up which are hosted on a FastFlux botnet. To be precise: It’s not new that cybercriminals are hosting the infections binaries (used to infect their vicitims) on FastFlux botnets. Even more it’s pretty new to me that the cybercrmininals are hosting their Command&Control servers (the servers which are hosting the dropzone) are also FastFlux hosted. For example:

To go along with this ‘new’ trend I decided to add a new ‘level’ to the ZeuS Tracker:

Level: 5
Description: Hosted on a FastFlux botnet
Color: Blue

Whenever you see a ZeuS C&C server which is FastFlux hosted on the ZT, the ZeuS Tracker will now provide you additional information:

As you can see above, the ZeuS Tracker shows up the assigned bots (IP addresses) as well as their status on Spamhaus’s XBL. Additionally the time to live (TTL) of the A record will be displayed (on FastFlux hosted domains mostly between 180 and 1800 seconds).

To get a list of ZeuS domains which are currenlty hosted on a FastFlux botnet you can just set a filter for “level 5” tagged domains on the ZeuS Tracker:

Currently there are just 9 domains hosted on a FastFlux botnet. But let’s see how many ZeuS C&Cs will move over to FastFlux hosting during the next few month.

Massive Drop in Number of Active Zeus C&C Servers

I always check the ZeuS Tracker statistics to get some information about the trend of the active ZeuS Command&Control servers. This morning I was really surprised what I saw on the ZeuS Tracker statistic page:


Massive drop of active ZeuS C&C servers on 2010-03-09

As you can see in the chart above, on March 9th 2010, the number of active ZeuS C&C servers dropped from 249 to 181! The first thing I thought was: There has to be some problem with the ZeuS Tracker cron script. I checked the script – everything looked ok. So the massive drop of ZeuS C&C server is fact. I noticed that six of the worst ZeuS hosting ISP suddently dissapeared from the ZeuS Tracker.

I verified the subnets of the affected ISP and came to the conclusion that Troyak-as (AS50215), the upstream provider for the six worst ZeuS hosting ISPs, was cut from the internet on 2010-03-09. As a result, the following ISPs lost their internet connetivity which finally resulted in a massiv drop in the number of active ZeuS C&C servers:

AS number: AS50390
AS name: SMILA-AS Pavlenko Tetyana Oleksandrivna
Subnet: 193.105.0.0/24
Status: Withdrawn
# of ZeuS C&Cs: 17
Spamhaus SBL: Not listed

AS number AS42229
AS name: MARIAM-AS PP Mariam
Subnet: 91.201.196.0/22
Status: Withdrawn
# of ZeuS C&Cs: 18
Spamhaus SBL: #SBL86729

AS number: AS49934
AS name: VVPN-AS PE Voronov Evgen Sergiyovich
Subnet: 193.104.41.0/24
Status: Withdrawn
# of ZeuS C&Cs: 8
Spamhaus SBL: #SBL82374

AS number: AS44107
AS name: PROMBUDDETAL-AS Prombuddetal LLCst
Subnet: 91.201.28.0/22
Status: Withdrawn
# of ZeuS C&Cs: 5
Spamhaus SBL: #SBL82408

AS number: AS50033
AS name: GROUP3-AS GROUP 3 LLC.
Subnet: 193.104.94.0/24
Status: Withdrawn
# of ZeuS C&Cs: 8
Spamhaus SBL: #SBL85667

AS number: AS12604
AS name: CITYGAME-AS Kamushnoy Vladimir Vasulyovich
Subnet: 193.104.27.0/24
Status: Withdrawn
# of ZeuS C&Cs: 12
Spamhaus SBL: #SBL81900

In total, 68 went down – It was the biggest drop in number of ZeuS C&C servers I’ve ever seen! Some guys have done a great job :D

*** UPDATE 21:03 (UTC) ***
Bad news – it seem that TROYAK-AS has found a new upstream provider to serve their malware to the world:

AS50215 TROYAK-AS Starchenko Roman Fedorovich

Upstream Adjacent AS list
AS44051 YA-AS Professional Communication Systems

Source: http://cidr-report.org/cgi-bin/as-report?as=AS50215

As you can see on Robtex, YA-AS has just one upstream provider called NASSIST-AS (AS29632). Let’s hope that this is just the last breath of TROYAK-AS and that NASSIST-AS will cut their peerings with YA-AS quickly.

*** STATUS 2010-03-11 07:15 (UTC) ***
I just took another look into the ZeuS Tracker statistics – the number of active ZeuS C&Cs is still falling! In total, I’ve counted 104 ZeuS C&C servers which are no longer reachable from the internet!


ZeuS Tracker statistics as of 2010-03-11

As mentioned on the last update from 21:03 UTC, Troyak just found a new upstream provider. This means: Troyak-AS is reconnected to the internet since yesterday. Anyway, I just checked the those ZeuS C&C servers which where routed by Troyak – all of them are still offline.

*** UPDATE 2010-03-11 11:50 (UTC) ***
It’s a very busy day – Troyak is trying hard to get back online. This morning they disappeared again from the global BGP routing table and are now being routed by RTCOMM-AS (AS8342 RTComm.RU), located in Russia:

AS50215 TROYAK-AS Starchenko Roman Fedorovich

Upstream Adjacent AS list
AS8342 RTCOMM-AS RTComm.RU Autonomous System

*** UPDATE 2010-03-11 21:30 (UTC)
Bad news: Since Troyak started their peering with RTCOM-AS, the number of active ZeuS C&C servers has increasted from 149 up to 191. For now, more than 40 ZeuS C&C servers are back online! This means that the cybercriminals are now able to move the stolen data to a safe place or a backup server. Additionally, the cybercriminals are able to update their config files served to the infected clients to set up a fallback server (if Troyak will disappear from the internet again).

*** UPDATE 2010-03-12 11:10 (UTC) ***
Another update: Troyak has changed their upstream provider again and is now being routed by NLINE-AS (AS25189 – JSC Nline):

AS50215 TROYAK-AS Starchenko Roman Fedorovich

Upstream Adjacent AS list
AS25189 NLINE-AS JSC Nline

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