Ransomware Gets Professional, Targeting Switzerland, Germany And Austria

In March I blogged about a ransomware which has been targeting various countries, locking down the victims computer due to “Child Porn and Terrorism”.

This week I spotted another ransomware campaign that is targeting Swiss, German, and Austrian internet users. This time the criminals seems to use a different schema to lock down the victims computer: violation of local copyright law.

*** Infection vector ****
The infection vector is a well known drive-by exploit kit called “Blackhole”. It is sold in underground forum and used by various criminal groups to infected computers “on the fly” by (ab)using one or more security vulnerabilities in the victims web browser (or a third party plug-in like Adobe Flash Player, Adobe Reader or Java). In this case a Blackhole exploit kit located at pampa04.com was involved to spread the ransomware:

hXXp://pampa04.com/main.php?page=d73d9795c56f8f33 [landing page]
-> hXXp://pampa04.com/data/ap2.php [JavaScript loading exploits]
–> hXXp://pampa04.com/Edu.jar [Java exploit]
—> hXXp://pampa04.com/w.php?f=5e91c&e=0 [Payload]

If the installed Java version on the victims computer is not up to date (unpatched), the downloaded jar file (Edu.jar) will exploit a well known vulnerability in Java which will trigger the download of the payload (Trojan) and finally execute it to infect the computer. The payload had a detection rate of 4/42 on Virustotal:

Filename: info.exe
MD5: 56f4d5837af32b12069576fae8c2b3c5
File size: 312.5 KB
AV-detection rate: 4/42

*** Analysis of the payload (Ransomware) ***
If the exploitation of the victims computer is successful, the Ransomware will install itself into the Application Data directory of the current user:

C:\Documents and Settings\Christoph\Application Data\itunes_service01.exe

Once the computer has been infected, the Ransomware will try to contact its Command&Control server (C&C) located at joonwalker.com using HTTP GET:

hXXp://joonwalker.com/unser1/redirector/redirector.php
hXXp://joonwalker.com/unser1/universalbezahlung/schweiz/index.php
hXXp://joonwalker.com/ajax/libs/jquery/1.3.2/jquery.min.js
hXXp://joonwalker.com/unser1/universalbezahlung/schweiz/bg_ch.gif
hXXp://joonwalker.com/unser1/universalbezahlung/schweiz/js/keyboard.js

The landing URL redirector.php will determine the location of the infected computer by using GeoIP and will redirect the request to the matching site by using HTTP 302 Found, for example:

hXXp://joonwalker.com/unser1/universalbezahlung/schweiz/index.php

While investigating this C&C I’ve found several other URLs which shows that this Ransomware is targeting not only Switzerland but also several other countries:

hXXp://joonwalker.com/unser1/universalbezahlung/schweiz/ (Switzerland)
hXXp://joonwalker.com/unser1/universalbezahlung/deutschland/ (Germany)
hXXp://joonwalker.com/unser1/universalbezahlung/oesterreich/ (Austria)
hXXp://joonwalker.com/unser1/universalbezahlung/england/ (England)
hXXp://joonwalker.com/unser1/universalbezahlung/frankreich/ (France)
hXXp://joonwalker.com/unser1/universalbezahlung/holland/ (Netherlands)
Country: Swiztzerland (SUISA)
Country: Germany (GVU)
   
Country: Austria (AKM)
Country: United Kingdom (PRS)
   
Country: France (SACEM)
Country: Netherlands (BUMA-STEMRA)
   

What lights up quickly when taking a look at these URLs is the fact that they are all written in German. So it looks like the cybercriminal behind this ransomware campaign is a German speaking person. While analysing all these different URLs I noticed that the cybercriminal has spent quite some time to prepare them. The language seems to be well written (I couldn’t find as many write errors as I would have expected). In addition it appears that the cybercriminal tried to get intel about where the victim can buy paysafecard (for the record: the victim has to pay a country specific amount of money to the cybercriminal using paysafecard to get his computer unlocked) and which association is tracking copyright infringement in the specific country. For example, he tells Swiss victims that they can obtain paysafecard on the federal railway station (SBB) and the MediaMark (a German based electronic discounter).

Another interesting finding is the fact that the Ransomware comes with an additional Trojan called Aldi Bot. Aldi Bot steals banking information (similar to ZeuS and SpyEye) and has some additional DDoS functionality.

Fortunately, Aldi Bot C&C traffic is very easy to identify due to the fact that this Trojan uses a specific User-Agent called “Aldi Bot FTW! :D ”. In this case the Aldi Bot C&C is located at the same server/domain as the Ransomware itself but on a different URI:

GET /unser1/universalpanel/gate.php?hwid=XXX&pc=XXX&localip=XXX&winver=XXX HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Aldi Bot FTW! :D
Host: joonwalker.com

*** Command&Control Infrastructure ***

The domain name used by this Ransomware and Aldi Bot is pointing to a Russian web hosting provider called “Amtel Svyaz”:

$ dig +short joonwalker.com
195.208.185.99

$ whois 195.208.185.99
inetnum: 195.208.184.0 – 195.208.187.255
netname: AMTEL-SVYAZ
descr: “Amtel Svyaz” ZAO
country: RU
org: ORG-AZ2-RIPE
admin-c: AG12682-RIPE
tech-c: AG12682-RIPE
tech-c: AG8732-RIPE
status: ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by: ROSNIIROS-MNT
mnt-domains: AMTELSV-MNT
mnt-routes: ROSNIIROS-MNT
source: RIPE # Filtered
[...]

The domain name joonwalker.com is registered through a Russian based domain registrar called Regtime Ltd (also known as webnames.ru):

Domain name: joonwalker.com

Name servers:
ns1.nameself.com
ns2.nameself.com

Registrar: Regtime Ltd.
Creation date: 2012-04-29
Expiration date: 2013-04-29

Registrant:
Huth Matthias
Email: huthmatthias@yahoo.de
Organization: Huth Matthias
Address: Bremenstrasse 12
City: Gladbeck
State: NRW
ZIP: 45964
Country: DE
Phone: +49.3051236167
Fax: +49.3051236169

According to whois the holder of this domain is “Huth Matthias” which has registered various other domain names this year:

arschenpustel.com
arschtrompete.com
arschtrompeteauto.com
arschtrompeteshop.com
bascvj.com
brauchnwanich.com
dergeldmacher.com
deutschecamworld.com
easyonlinebuxxx.com
fettehupenalter.com
fiftypercentworker.com
flobbo-online.com
fressehaltenlol.com
fuehlediebezahlung.com
fuehlediecon.com
geiledeutschecams.com
geileschnittendicketitten.com
geld-machen-mit-ebooks.com
geldverdienen-easy.com
gema-gebuehreneinzug.in
gemagatezor.com
gemagatezor.net
gewinnspiele-king.com
grosqa.com
helexxaione.com
hunnibezahlor.com
hunniconnector.com
ichmussconnecten.com
joonwalker.com
knallrattern.com
kohlhanser.com
konschtantin.com
kuemmeljoe.com
leckerfrischekacke.com
meineguetekak.com
meineherrenlaff.com
mightyporntube.com
mjun1.info
mongoneger.com
moxitoeex.com
moxitom.com
muellgeburten.com
muselfrauen.com
nulpapors.com
odrjaj.com
ratschuikakk.com
ratzeputzel.com
reich-durch-ebooks.com
toilettenspuelung.com
trueffelmueffel.com
tschaijikki.com
tujkea.com
universalpan1.com
universalpan2.com
urgeprotectar.com
vabrus.com
verdienjegek.com
whatwillhappenbaby.com
wonkeebonkii.com
xakacj.com
zeig-malmo-pse.in
zeig-malmopse.in
zeigmalmoepse.in
zeigmalmopse.in

All these domain names can be considered as malicious and should be blocked on your network edge.
To prevent this kind of infections you should ensure that your operating system as well as all installed applications (especially browser plug-ins) are up to date.

*** Further reading ***

AMaDa Discontinued, Palevo Tracker With A New Home

As announced on Twitter last month, abuse.ch Malware Database (AMaDa) has been discontinued on 2012-03-17.

Since my announcement on Twitter to discontinue AMaDa, I received several dozen emails from IT security representatives of ISPs, national CERTs as well as governmental and non-governmental organisations that were using AMaDa’s blocklist to identify compromised computers within their networks. I have to say that I was quite amazed how many people used AMaDa’s blocklist. However I’m unable to answer all these emails due to lack of time, hence I decided to publish a short statement on my blog.

AMaDa was launched in 2010, since then it has analysed 169’545 URLs serving malware, 160’183 malicious binaries and identified 1’685 malware botnet controllers associated with all kinds of Trojans (like Mebroot, TLD/TDSS, Carberp, BlackEnergy, Ramnit and many more).

In February 2011, I started Palevo Tracker as sub-project of AMaDa. Palevo Tracker’s blocklist was served together with the AMaDa IP and Domain blocklist.

Running and maintaining the tracking infrastructure (ZeuS-, SpyEye- and Palevo Tracker) is very time intensive, also since it created much “background noise” (sometimes I think I need a secretary to handle all emails and requests). Hence I was prevented from blogging as much as I would have liked to last year. Unfortunately, every day only has 24 hours, and due to personal circumstances as well as my focus on other (non-public) projects I’m no longer able to provide AMaDa’s data / information with a good enough quality. I always serve data and information on “best effort” basis, and as I’m no longer able commit to that for AMaDa I’ve decided to discontinue the project (please keep in mind that all these projects are done in my spare time).

I’m aware that this is bad news for many of you, but fortunately I also have some good news. This weekend I moved Palevo Tracker onto a new infrastructure. I decided to keep Palevo Tracker running as a “new” project. Since AMaDa is gone, Palevo Tracker has found a new home on it’s own sub domain:

Palevo Tracker (including it’s blocklists) can be found at https://palevotracker.abuse.ch

If you are using one of AMaDa’s blocklists, please ensure that you stop query them as they are no longer available. If you want to keep up identifying Palevo botnet C&Cs please switch to one of the blocklists available on Palevo Tracker’s Blocklist page.

*** Links ***




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